Martyrs of Freedom: Remembering the Victims of Bud Dahu Massacre

Like a school of fish in a glass bowl, some 1,000 Moro men, women, and children found themselves swimming in their own blood inside the fifty-foot crater of Bud Dahu—a dormant volcanic mountain six kilometers off Jolo, the capital town and show window of Sulu Province in Mindanao.

They were caught unprepared when, from the edges atop the crater, a troop of 800 American soldiers fired down into the bowl. They fought desperately but their kris (a wavy-edge sword), hunting spears, and rifles were simply no match against the Americans’ high-caliber artillery. Some of them, including women and children, were mowed down by as many as fifty bullets while others were impaled upon bayonets. Only six survived the four-day assault.

The encounter took place more than a hundred years ago—March 5-8, 1906. The American government preferred to call it a battle—bloody and violent, yes, but a legitimate armed confrontation between the military forces and a group of lawless fanatics. US President Theodore Roosevelt even commended the American Army for “a most gallant and soldierly feat” in the fight at Mt. Dahu.

Pundits, however, were quick to point out the contrary. American literary luminary and social critic Mark Twain called the encounter a massacre, the US troops uniformed assassins, and the Moros “helpless and weapon-less savages in a hole like rats in a trap.” American historian Vic Hurley noted that, “by no stretch of the imagination could Bud Dahu be termed a ‘battle.’ The Americans troops stormed a high mountain peak crowned by fortifications to kill 1,000 Moros with a loss to themselves of twenty-one killed and seventy-three wounded! The casualty reflects the unequal nature of the battle.”

History tells us now that the victims were a community of Tausugs who fled to Bud Dahu in defiance of the American rule and occupation of Mindanao. Spain ruled the country for 333 years but the Moros never recognized its authority. The Moros isolated themselves in the southern islands of Mindanao. And when the Americans took over, they were no readier to obey the new colonizers than they were the Spaniards.

Today, the Bud Dahu bloodbath continues to inspire the Bangsamoro people in their struggle for self-determination. They invoke the same spirit in resisting the presence of American forces who have been conducting military exercises in Mindanao through the Visiting Forces Agreement between the Philippine and US governments. They are still trying to make sense of the peace agreement signed by the national government and the Moro National Liberation Front exactly fifteen years ago this March.

More than one hundred years after the Bud Dahu massacre, Filipino Muslims, as Moros are called nowadays, are faced with virtually the same issues: resistance to American imperialism, the quest for peace, and the desire for self-determination.

Postscript: In 2006, the Senate declared the victims of Bud Dahu massacre “Martyrs of Freedom” and March 6 of every year Bud Dahu Day.

Civilians in the crossfire: “They are not expendable”

For civilians living in militarized zones, it is not a matter of choosing sides. If they turn to the military, they are exposed to physical assault, arbitrary arrest, or even torture. If they turn to the insurgents, they are susceptible to kidnapping, execution, or shooting. It is a matter of getting out of the crossfire.

Reports from nongovernmental organization Human Rights Watch (HRW) indicate that since 2000, armed groups in Basilan, Jolo, and other southern islands have killed or injured more than 1,700 civilians in bombings and other forms of attack. The military, meanwhile, has reportedly played a role in the recent forced disappearances and killings of community activists, outspoken clergy, journalists assigned in areas targeted for counter-insurgency operations, and members of left-wing political parties.

According to the HRW Report, human rights abuses by the military seem to have heightened in August 2006, when President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo adopted an “all-out-war” strategy against the New People’s Army (NPA) which she accused of allying with coup plotters to destabilize her government. Apparently, the strategy sent the message to the military that “abuses would be tolerated,” as gleaned from reports of their supposed involvement in extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances.

Former Lt. Gen. Jaime S. de los Santos, who served as brigade commander at the height of the government’s campaign against the Communist Party of the Philippines-NPA-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front from 1994 to 1997, admits that civilians do get harmed during military operations. These innocent victims go by the cold, if cruel, tag of “collateral damage.”

But de los Santos is quick to clarify that, during encounters, the safety of civilians is always their primary concern. If civilians do get harmed, it is because things are at most times beyond the military’s control. “It is never the policy of the military to condone human rights violations,” said the 42nd Commanding General of the Philippine Army. “The Armed Forces of the Philippines recognizes the provision in our Constitution that civilian authority is at all times superior to the military. And that the military exists to protect the civilians.”

He explains that, in an armed confrontation where the rules are not clearly defined, it is difficult to determine who the enemies are. The NPA/NDF, for example, is actually split into two groups—the NPA or the armed cluster and the NDF or the non-armed cluster, whose members are mostly professionals who help the NPA formulate and communicate its ideologies to society. Although unarmed, elements of the NDF usually go with the NPA even during combat operations. And in a situation where the exchange of gunfire is dangerously incessant, combatants do not have time to carefully distinguish one enemy target from another.

De los Santos also points out that the military engages an insurgent group in an armed encounter based on intelligence reports which are classified according to their reliability. “Intelligence reports go through very rigid verification processes,” he says. “If we receive an A1, it means the intelligence is highly reliable. It also means that the enemy target is heavily armed and, therefore, we must have a preponderance of force when we launch our offensive. If F6, we can ignore it.”

The military observes the Rules of Engagement (RoE) as laid down by the United Nations Protection Forces. De los Santos, who once served as Force Commander of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor Peacekeeping Force, notes that the RoE—written orders which determine when troops may use force—may be interpreted in two ways. Either the troops cannot use force until they are fired upon, or the troops may initiate the use of force based on the nature of the confrontation described in the intelligence report. If it is A1, the troops may initiate the use of force upon sighting the enemy. “Soldiers are trained to be very careful during pursuit operations. We are careful not to fire indiscriminately,” he says. “But in an offensive attack, our assumption is that we are dealing with hardcore insurgents. We are engaging enemies who are also trained to fight. And I think it is but normal that we also think of our own safety. In fact, under the military doctrine, the accepted ratio of soldiers to the number of those being attacked is 3:1, to be on the safe side.”

Other than combat operation, the military also employs another approach in subduing hostile forces: the Civic Military Operations (CMO). According to de los Santos, combat operation is the military’s right-hand effort which, as described earlier, involves the use of force. The CMO, meanwhile, is the left-hand effort, a means for the military to efficiently minimize incidents that are often misinterpreted as extrajudicial killings or forced disappearances. “Through the CMO, we embark on community development projects, such as literacy campaigns. We also conduct seminars to enlighten the communities about the evils of insurgency,” he said. “In a way, we try to get the sympathy of the communities in the hope that they will help us crush armed groups instead of supporting them.”

Community members who have been convinced to support the armed forces in the campaign against insurgency are organized to form the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU). Members of CAFGU are given military training, military uniforms, and firearms, and provided a monthly allowance of around P2,500. Asked about reports on the CAFGU members themselves committing abuses, de los Santos says, “They operate under the rules and regulations of the military, so whatever abuses they commit are readily monitored and dealt with accordingly.”

He admits that there are also human rights violations brought about by the implementation of CMO, especially in remote areas where there is hardly any control from the top. This problematic situation is being addressed by efforts to upgrade the military’s communication system. The AFP is taking advantage of modern equipment that will enable it to monitor its units even in far-flung barrios which are mostly infiltrated by rebel groups.

Aside from improving the management of its CMO projects, de los Santos believes it is necessary to improve the quality of leadership of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in units where direct contact between the troops and civilians takes place. “In the choice of battalion leaders and company commanders, we should give premium to track record in terms of integrity, discipline, composure, experience, and personality,” he says. “We should send senior officers who can serve as role models not only to the soldiers but also to the community.”

The participation of other government agencies in the implementation of CMO serves as a check-and-balance mechanism. “The presence of other agencies somehow tempers the rigidity of military rules,” says de los Santos. “The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, for example, was a collaboration among government agencies with the AFP and it proved to be very helpful in our combat, intelligence, and civil military operations during my stint in Western Mindanao. We need to strengthen this inter-agency coordination.”

Ultimately, however, it is the people themselves who should be able to guard and fight for their rights. And this is possible only if they know what their rights are, which is why one component of the CMO is devoted to educating the communities. In the end, it is an enlightened community that can best deter abuses that may be committed by the military.